O mistério da vida e o mistério do ser em Heidegger e Agamben

Abstract

The article seeks to explore Agamben's critique, in his book The Open, of the ontology of life presented by Heidegger in the course of the winter semester of 1929/30, entitled The fundamental concepts of metaphysics: world, finitude and solitude. Agamben points to an anthropocentrism implicit in the metaphysics of being-there, which Heidegger presents and defends in the aforementioned course. However, Agamben's criticism is weak because he argues that the conflict between the unconcealment of the entity and the concealment of the being is internal to man. Now, for Heidegger, unconcealment and concealment constitute truth itself as alétheia, therefore diametrically opposed to truth as adequacy between statement and object, which presupposes subjectivity and, consequently, metaphysics, to which the metaphysics of being -he seeks to overcome. It is intended, then, to demonstrate how the correlation between truth and nature begins to take shape there, which, understood in the Greek sense, according to Heidegger, are pre-metaphysical, that is, nature is constituted both by the totality of beings and by of the being as such and reveals itself at the same time that it conceals itself in the truth, which in turn is a phenomenon and precedes any and all conceptualization. In that case, the mystery of being will later present itself as the concealment of beings in their totality, which is co-originary with the uncovering of beings as such. In this case, first an approximation is sought between the mystery of life and the mystery of being, followed by a demonstration of how the latter, as it is the concealment of the entity in the whole (physis in the broad sense), encompasses life as a whole.